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ABSTRACT  
 When the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency recently declassified 
documents relating to the 1953 Coup in Iran, it was discovered that American 
involvement was much deeper than previously known. In fact, the CIA had orchestrated 
the coup against democratically-elected Mohammed Mossadegh. This action was sold to 
the United States public as being essential to democracy, which seems contradictory to its 
actual purpose. U.S. political leaders justified the coup by linking it to what Charles Mills 
calls “racial liberalism,” a longstanding ideological tradition in America that elevates the 
white citizen to a place of power and protection while making the racial noncitizens 
“others” in the political system. Political leaders in the United States relied on bribing the 
American media to portray the Shah as the white citizen and Mossadegh as a racial other, 
the white citizen was restored to power and the racial other was overthrown. 
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DEDICATION  
  
For my uncle, Thomas Williams: 
“Nothing behind me, everything ahead of me, as is ever so on the road.”  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, an American Secretary of State met with an Iranian foreign minister for 
the first time since diplomatic relations were severed in 1979. At that time, Americans in 
the Embassy in Tehran were held as hostages for over 14 months by irate Iranians. That 
point was the culmination of years of anti-American sentiment and American meddling in 
Iran. This renewed effort to forge a relationship between the countries has resulted in a 
chance for détente in U. S. /Iranian relations. 
The relationship between the United States and Iran is long and fraught with 
intrigue. The catalyst for the chilly relations was the Iranian Coup of 1953, wherein the 
democratically-elected leader of Iran, Mohammed Mossadegh, was dethroned by the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in favor of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of 
Iran. Both the United States and Britain were involved in the coup, though motivated by 
separate goals: “British officials planned to overthrow Mossadegh for political and 
economic interests centered on control of Iran’s oil reserves. U.S. officials became 
involved in Iran’s politics to satisfy their own post-World War II excitement (Pashai, 7).” 
In this instance, post-war excitement refers to the proliferation of Communism and the 
zealous efforts to defeat it. 
This event, the involvement of British and American powers in Iranian internal 
politics, had far-reaching and long-lasting effects. The Coup initiated a domino effect 
through the region, the effects of which, including destabilization in the region and 
increased Islamic militantism, are still being felt worldwide today. In fact, according to 
Kerman and Wood, “[i]t has been argued that this event ultimately did more damage to 
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Iran than any singular event in its long history (p. 29).” Iranian citizens, who had long 
fought for democracy in their country, resented the installation of the Shah’s pick for 
Prime Minister, General Zahedi. In 1979, Islamic radicals, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, 
overthrew the Shah. The resentment of his collusion with the West had reached a fever 
pitch: when the Shah sought and was granted sanctuary in the United States, the Iranian 
people retaliated by holding hostages at the American Embassy in Tehran for 444 days. 
President Carter, the incumbent President of the United States, retaliated by seizing 
Iranian assets.  
After the resolution of the hostage crisis, the animosity between the United States 
and Iran had solidified into a deep, mutual loathing and distrust. When Iraq invaded Iran 
in 1980, Islamic revolutionaries suspected American involvement (Amin, n.p.). In fact, 
the Carter administration had “provided military hardware to Iraq, including the basic 
raw materials that Saddam Hussein’s regime used to make chemical weapons (Amin, 
n.p.),” a major concern for the Western world in decades to follow. 
Surprisingly, only eleven years before this event, Tehran had been bestowed upon 
the honor of hosting the 20th anniversary celebrations for the passage of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. At the time, the deliberate choice of location signified 
Iran’s place in the upper-echelons of Third World elite. Iran, and the Shah himself, were 
lauded with praise. UN Secretary-General U Thant supported the choice of location, 
saying it was “very fitting that we should commemorate such an anniversary in a land 
whose culture and civilization are among the oldest in the world (Thant via Burke, 283).” 
Yet this conference also signified a break between the Shah and his Western 
benefactors. In fact, the conference, with its sparse archives and few transcripts, was 
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considered by many in the human rights world, including the International Commission 
of Jurists (ICJ), as “somewhere between a failure and an outright catastrophe (Burke, 
276).” ICJ Chief Sean McBride elaborated: “the Proclamation [of Tehran, which has been 
largely omitted from U.N. historical documents] deals with less than half the rights 
enumerated in the Universal Declaration. It goes no further in defining and enlarging 
these rights and in some cases may even be said to limit the pronouncements of the 
Universal Declaration (McBride via Burke, 276).” The conference was eclipsed by the 
second Conference in Vienna, which strengthened the original Declaration and resulted in 
“concrete proposals for the long debated Office of the High Commissioner (Burke, 276).” 
The disdain of the Universal Declaration expressed at the conference was the Shah and 
Iranian leaders effectively shedding the self-imposed “whiteness” they had assumed at 
the beginning of the Iranian revolution of 1953 (Burke, 284-5). Instead, the Shah and his 
sister, Princess Ashraf Pahlavi, emphasized Iran’s place as a leader of the “South.” 
According to Pahlavi, “While the Western countries stressed the rights of the individual, 
developing countries were thinking of the rights of entire peoples (Pahlavi via Burke, 
296).” 
Since that point, the grievances the two countries have for each other are plentiful: 
Iran believes that the United States is too supportive of Israel and uses inflammatory 
rhetoric to cast Iran as the evil presence in the Middle East (Bush, n.p.). The United 
States, on the other hand, is “critical of Iran’s violation of human rights and repression of 
democratic opposition (Amin, n.p.).” 
Perhaps the United States’ revulsion of Iran’s antidemocratic processes is to be 
expected. In the Declaration of Independence, the Founding Fathers professed the deepest 
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beliefs in these freedoms: that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit 
of Happiness. The American Creed professes the importance of citizens’ participation 
and consent in government. Democracy, life, liberty for all men – this is our creed. 
Yet, as seen with their involvement in the Coup of 1953, the American leaders do 
not always defend these values for others in exchange for perceived self-interest: the 
destruction of Communism, the protection of property rights, and the preservation of 
alliances. During this event, incumbent President Eisenhower; the Dulles brothers, 
Secretary of State John Foster and CIA director Allen; and Kermit Roosevelt, a chief of 
the CIA’s Near East and Asia Division and relative of both Roosevelt presidents 
orchestrated a campaign against the incumbent Prime Minister of Iran, Mohammed 
Mossadegh. By bribing mobs and military officers, bribing both American and Iranian 
press to print CIA-approved propaganda, and convincing the Shah to dismiss Mossadegh, 
the United States and Britain achieved the double victory of preserving British oil 
concessions and fighting off the threat of communism. This coup was one in a long 
history of supporting the overthrow of democratically-elected regimes and/or defending 
repressive and authoritarian regimes. The next year, in Guatemala, the United States 
intervened in overthrowing another leader that threatened white property rights, Jacobo 
Árbenz. Though Árbenz was trained in the United States, he soon “attempted a series of 
land reforms that threatened the holdings of the U.S.- owned United Fruit Company,” and 
was subsequently overthrown (Suster, n.p.) The Congo, the Dominican Republic, and the 
Republic of South Korea were all treated to the United States’ brand of leadership 
overthrow in the years after the Iranian Coup.  
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 How do US political leaders justify the overthrow of democratically elected 
regimes to a public that is ostensibly and deeply committed to the ideals of liberal 
democracy? One possible explanation is that leaders highlight different foreign interests 
that outweigh those ideals, such as the defense against communism. In Iran, it seems, 
President Eisenhower and the CIA demoted democracy to a secondary concern in relation 
to the defeat of even the threat of communism in the Middle East. American media 
sources seemed to fervently support the actions of Eisenhower and the CIA. In the face of 
spreading communism, the American people, it can be argued, valued democracy less 
than a capitalistic society. However, this view is rather cynical in assuming that 
American citizens are simply willing to suspend their support for liberal democracy when 
it comes to US interests overseas. Their belief in the ideals of liberal democracy is deeper 
and more sincere than that. A better explanation must show how leaders frame these 
coups overseas as themselves extensions of liberal democracy. Liberalism is taken 
seriously in the United States, and has been etched into the collective values by its 
incorporation into the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. Power is 
derived from the consent of the governed, with no caveats pertaining to communist threat 
or economic preservation. These values cannot be used cynically, they are much too dear 
to the fabric of Americanism. Therefore, they must have an ideological justification. This 
sets up the turn to racial liberalism. 
In the coming pages, I argue that Eisenhower and other U.S. political leaders 
publicly justified the coup in Iran by linking it to what Charles Mills calls racial 
liberalism, a longstanding ideological tradition in America that elevates the white citizen 
to a place of power and protection while making the racial noncitizens “others” in the 
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political system. Realizing that these actions, which on the surface can seem so contrary 
to our professed values, are in fact in line with the American creed, can help us uncover a 
deeper understanding of our idea of democracy. Democracy is nuanced and leads to 
moral quandaries such as the involvement in the Coup. Due to the inherent racial 
structure of liberalism, not supporting democracy in Iran was an extension of American 
values, not a suspension. 
This paper will take the theory of racial liberalism and explain how it manifests in 
American involvement in Iran during the Coup of 1953. By applying this theory, this 
paper will attempt to prove that U.S. political leaders draw on racial liberalism to justify 
foreign as well as domestic interventions to the American public. The Coup of Iran was 
chosen as a case study because it was a significant coup that the United States 
participated in and, until recently, American involvement been shrouded in secrecy. This 
case presents a clear case of perceived hypocrisy, yet can be easily reconciled with racial 
liberalism. This study will attempt to add to the conversation regarding racial liberalism 
by showing racial liberalism as an additional framework for which to view American 
support of the Coup and the Shah. 
The theory explanation in Chapter 2 will analyze the theory of racial liberalism as 
put forth by Charles Mills and explain the concepts of the White Citizen and the Racial 
Other. The thesis will then move into a history discussion in Chapter 3. It will summarize 
the history of US/Iranian relations, the Iranian Coup, and the racialized environment of 
the Eisenhower administration at the time of the Coup. Chapter 4 will present the case 
study, beginning with the methodology used. I will present evidence in the form of 
newspaper and media articles regarding both the Shah and Mohammed Mossadegh, 
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highlighting the effects of racial liberalism on their individual portrayals. Finally, I will 
conclude with an insight to how racial liberalism has affected the United States’ action 
during the Arab Spring. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORY 
The coup was reconciled with American values of democracy to the American 
public by understanding and applying Charles W. Mills’s theory of racial liberalism as 
the framework in which these actions are undertaken.  Racial liberalism suggests that 
liberalism and democracy are inherently racialized, with the benefits guaranteed for white 
men only. American intervention in democratic Iran, which seems counterproductive in 
the American quest for democracy, was sold to the American public by exemplifying the 
ideals of racial liberalism through the media, which helps us understand how democratic 
leaders can square these values at home with action abroad. “White 
citizenship…reconciles racially oppressive practices with democratic ideals (Olson, The 
Abolition of White Democracy, 47).” 
The concept of white citizenship stems from the theory of the Racial Contract, 
also by Mills. The idea of a racial contract, opposed to a social contract or gender 
contract, creates a “conceptual bridge between the world of mainstream white ethics and 
political philosophy and the world of minority political thought (Mills, The Racial 
Contract, 4),” which emphasizes the view of the minority in the context of the majority 
point of view. In short, “White supremacy is the unnamed political system that has made 
the modern world what it is today (Mills, The Racial Contract, 1).” 
Unlike other social contract theories, this theory has historical evidence, rather 
than being prescriptive for the future or descriptive of the present. The ability to view 
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historical events through the lens of the Racial Contract is essential to this case study. As 
Mills explains: 
“…[T]he Racial Contract…has the best claim to being an actual historical fact. 
Far from being lost in the mist of the ages, it is clearly historically locatable in the 
series of events marking the creation of the modern world by European 
colonialism and the voyages of “discovery” now increasingly and more 
appropriately called expeditions of conquest. The Columbian quincentenary a few 
years ago, with its accompanying debates, polemics, controversies, 
counterdemonstrations, and outpourings of revisionist literature, confronted many 
whites with the uncomfortable fact, hardly discussed in mainstream and moral 
political theory, that we live in a world that has been foundationally shaped for 
the past five hundred years by the realities of European domination and the 
gradual consolidation of global white supremacy. Thus not only is the Racial 
Contract “real,” but – whereas the social contract is characteristically taken to be 
establishing the legitimacy of the nation-state, and codifying morality and law 
within its boundaries – the Racial Contract is global, involving a tectonic shift of 
ethicojuridical basis of the planet as a whole, the division of the world, as Jean-
Paul Sartre put it long ago, between “men” and “natives (Mills, The Racial 
Contract, 19)”.” 
Mills is suggesting that racial liberalism can be seen in practice in our own 
history. Such instances as slavery in the antebellum south can be explained through the 
framework of racial liberalism. According to Mills’s, “At the most basic level, liberalism 
is a political theory about the equitable treatment of individuals conceptualized as 
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morally equal, whose basic rights and freedoms should be respected (Mills, Liberalism 
and the Racial State, 45).” However, the definition above does not state “all individuals,” 
but those who are “conceptualized as morally equal.” To elaborate: 
“The Racial Contract is that set of formal or informal agreements or meta-
agreements…between the members of one subset of humans, henceforth 
designated by (shifting) “racial” (phenotypical/genealogical/cultural) criteria C1, 
C2, C3…as “white,” and coextensive (making due allowance for gendered 
differentiation) with the class of full persons, to categorize the remaining subset 
of humans as “nonwhite” and of a different and inferior moral status, subpersons, 
so that they have a subordinate civil standing in the white or white-ruled polities 
the whites either already inhabit or establish or in transactions as aliens with these 
polities, and the moral and juridical rules normally regulating the behavior of 
whites in their dealings with one another either do not apply at all in dealings with 
nonwhites or apply only in a qualified form (depending in part on changing 
historical circumstances and what particular variety of nonwhite is involved), but 
in any ease the general purpose of the Contract is always the differential 
privileging of the whites as a group with respect to the nonwhites as a group, the 
exploitation of their bodies, land and resources, and the denial of equal 
socioeconomic opportunities to them. All whites are beneficiaries of the Contract, 
though some whites are no signatories to it (Mills, The Racial Contract, 11).” 
Race is a social construct, as described above. While it generally relies on the 
“phenotypical/genealogical/cultural” criteria to create a class of white citizens, it is fluid 
and “shifting”. This grouping of people into the citizen class creates an other class, that of 
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the racial other. Being a white citizen, however, does not mean that they agree with the 
structure, yet they ultimately benefit regardless of their personal acceptance of the racial 
contract. The racial contract creates a racial liberalism, in which freedom and privileges 
are reserved for the dominant, historically white, citizen class. As Mills states: 
"Liberalism…has historically been predominantly a racial liberalism (Stokes and 
Melendez), in which conceptions of personhood and resulting schedules of rights, 
duties, and government responsibilities have all been racialized. And the contract, 
correspondingly, has really been a racial one, an agreement among white 
contractors to subordinate and exploit non-white noncontractors for white benefit 
(Mills, Racial Contract, 1381)."  
The adoption of this racial contract, in turn, creates two political identities: that of the 
white citizen, who is a full rights-bearer in society, and that of the racial other. Joel Olson 
establishes the definition of whiteness as a social construct, distinguishing between white 
as a biological identity and white as a political identity. White does not refer to skin 
color, but to the dominant class, which is generally white. In creating a dominant class, 
the separation also causes an “other” group to materialize as those without privilege. 
According to Olson, citizenship is defined against slavery: the citizen is the nonslave 
(Olson, The Abolition of White Democracy, 43).  
In some cases, the privileges of the citizen class depend on the exclusion or 
exploitation of the other group. For instance, in the antebellum South, for white citizens 
to protect their economic participation and livelihood, they enslaved a race of ‘others’ to 
work their fields for no pay. To defend the white citizens’ freedom was to defend the 
practice of slavery, and to defend property rights (a hallmark of a free citizen) was to 
  12 
subjugate slaves as property. Therefore, to defend freedom and democracy for its 
citizens, the United States defended the oppression of the racial other. 
 Race, in fact, was invented to support the plantations of the South (Olson, The 
Abolition of White Democracy, 37). By creating a racial other, even the poorest of whites 
felt unified with the rich sharecroppers and plantation owners. It “emerged from the 
needs of the Virginia upper class to craft a docile and productive labor force (Olson, The 
Abolition of White Democracy, 38).” Instead of binding with Black slaves to riot against 
the oppressive rich owners, the poor whites now found themselves on the same level as 
their white bosses. These whites, poor and rich alike, were guaranteed, “…the right to 
own property (including human property), the right to share in the public business, and a 
pledge to ensure the degraded position of all those defined as Black (Olson, The Abolition 
of the White Democracy, 38).” 
Working within the framework of racial liberalism, U.S. political leaders could 
justify the overthrow of Mossadegh as a democratic act by linking it to the defense of the 
White Citizen. In more concrete terms, they would have to frame the Shah – 
Mossadegh’s primary opponent – as a stand-in for the interests of this citizen, by 
“whitewashing” the Shah to be perceived as a white citizen. The American media played 
a primary role in whitewashing the Shah, by responding to bribes by the CIA and 
reporting a very specific picture of both the Shah and Mossadegh to the public. Both 
Mohammed Reza Shah and the West “whitewashed” the Shah in adherence to racial 
liberalism. The West exploited these social constructs of race by placing two people from 
the same ethnic background into very different political categories: the Shah as “white” 
and Mossadegh as “other”. The Shah and his family claimed whiteness, investing in 
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maintaining whiteness and being a part of the citizen group, by aligning themselves with 
Western values and education (‘Shah of Iran’s a Very Modern Monarch,’ S3). In the 
1950s United States, whitewashing the Shah meant presenting him as a leader that 
exemplifies the following traits: support of capitalism, support of the West, and 
dedication to democracy. To be seen as white, the Shah had to align himself with a 
particular agenda that is associated with the White Citizen. The Shah had to shape 
himself to the image of a White Citizen to secure the privileges of citizenship: dominion 
over the other class and preservation of his throne. The Shah helped the British oil 
investors maintain their hold on the valuable oil in Iran. When Mossadegh’s oil 
nationalization plan threatened oil profits for the British stakeholders, much like when the 
U. S. was threatened by expanding tobacco farms and dwindling servant force, the upper 
classes invented divisions to protect their wealth. In the case of the antebellum south, 
slave owners and other privileged groups invented the division between the white class 
and the racial other, the slave. In the case of Iran, U.S. political leaders pushed the 
viewpoint that the Shah was a Capitalist and white citizen, while Communist Mossadegh 
was a racial other. By emphasizing the Shah’s connection to capitalism and Western 
society, such as visits to the United States and his education abroad, the Shah is 
effectively cast as a member of the white, dominant class, both by his Western allies and 
by his own positioning. 
On the other hand, Mohammed Mossadegh refused to adapt white, Western 
values, most significantly by refusing to respect the capitalistic interests of Britain in 
Iranian oil. The CIA and MI5, British secret intelligence, denied Mossadegh and his 
supporters general access to the citizenry. They and their perceived Communist values 
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were a threat to some of the white class’s property rights (namely, the British-owned 
AIOC’s perceived rights to Iranian oil) and Capitalism, and therefore were a threat to the 
system as a whole. American news articles, which were heavily bribed by the CIA to 
print media in accordance with its goals, cast Mossadegh as a power-hungry communist 
and the Iranians as barbaric, with media coverage that focused on rioting Mossadegh 
supporters. Mossadegh also creates this image for himself, albeit with a more benign 
stated mission. He portrays himself as anti-Western, for the people of Iran. Both he and 
American media paint Mossadegh as unaligned with Western powers for different 
reasons: for him, to earn the trust and support of the Iranian people; for the West, to vilify 
an aggressive force. 
To be anti-Western was to be anti-Imperialist, anti-Democratic, and anti-
American. Unfortunately for Mossadegh, this action created a racial other of himself. The 
racial contract that established the United States society and government,  
…thereby transforming abstract raceless “men” from denizens of the state of 
nature into social creatures who are politically obligated to a neutral state, 
becomes the founding of a racial polity, whether white settler states (where 
preexisting populations already are or can be made sparse) or what are sometimes 
called “sojourner colonies,” the establishment of a white presence and colonial 
rule over existing societies (which are somewhat more populous or whose 
inhabitants are more resistant to being made sparse). In addition, the colonizing 
mother country is also changed by its relation to these new polities, so that its own 
citizens are altered (Mills, The Racial Contract, 12).” 
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Involvement in the Coup was only justifiable by somehow altering the citizens of the 
United States, by reaching them through the media. 
 Regardless of the veracity of Mossadegh’s communist leanings, his portrayal as a 
communist was what ultimately marked him as a racial other. Societies create social to 
preserve the property rights of the citizen, and by tangling with nationalized oil and 
communist ideals, Mossadegh was a foe to existing social contract.  
“[T]he classic social contract…is also economic in the background sense that the 
point of leaving the state of nature is in part to secure a stable environment for he 
industrious appropriation of the world…Thus even in Locke’s moralized state of 
nature, where people generally do obey natural laws, he is concerned about the 
safety of private property, indeed proclaiming that “the great and chief end 
therefore, of Men uniting into Commonwealths, and putting themselves under 
Government, is the Preservation of their Property. 
…[T]he economic dimension of the Racial Contract is the most salient, 
foreground rather than background, since the Racial Contract is calculatedly 
aimed at economic exploitation. The whole point of establishing amoral hierarchy 
and juridically partitioning the polity according to race is to secure and legitimate 
the privileging of those individuals designated as white/persons and the 
exploitation of those individuals designated as nonwhite/subpersons (Mills, The 
Racial Contract, 31-2).” 
 The reasons for American presidential administrations and CIA involvement in 
the Coup of 1953 will not be discussed. Instead, we are focusing on how these actions 
were justified to the people of the United States as being in-line with their dedication to 
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democracy. Yet when democracy is racialized, protecting the white hierarchy becomes 
vital. As Mills claims:  
“…the model of the Racial Contract shows us that we need another alternative, 
another way of theorizing about and critiquing the state: the racial, or white-
supremacist, state, whose function inter alia is to safeguard the polity as a white or 
white-dominated polity, enforcing the terms of the Racial Contract by the 
appropriate means and when necessary, facilitating its rewriting from one form to 
another (Mills, The Racial Contract, 82).” 
In other words, protecting the racial order of the state is a major function of said state. In 
a liberal society, such as the United States, the racial order must be preserved by the state. 
This, along with defense of property rights, were emphasized to the American public 
through the media as why the Coup, the Shah, and the existing social order in Iran were 
beneficial and not contrary to democracy. 
By thinking through the relationship between racial liberalism and U.S. 
involvement in the 1953 coup, scholars of social justice and human rights also stand to 
gain a couple of broader insights. The commitment to liberty and democracy espoused in 
domestic U.S. politics actually shapes rather than undermines public support for foreign 
actions such as the coup in Iran. The other is that the ideological framework of racial 
liberalism – forged in the context of slavery and the Jim Crow south – also shapes 
support for the exercise of U.S. politics and government in other, seemingly distant and 
unrelated settings. The theory of racial liberalism provides a continuity to American 
domestic and foreign values, resolving the dissonance that can be perceived between 
domestic democracy and foreign involvement. 
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CHAPTER 3 
HISTORY 
Prior to World War II, the paths of the United States and Iran did not often cross. 
The 20th century in Iran is marked with a struggle for political identity and legitimacy. 
After overthrowing their foreign rulers, the Qajar dynasty, in 1906, Iranians were 
presented with the startling opportunity to forge their own government and way of rule. 
Iran was at a strategic location, both ideologically and geographically, to be a pawn in 
Cold War intrigues. As the threat of Communism loomed and attracted many of the 
working class, the Iranian elite class espoused Western ideals, such as modernization, 
secular government, and Western cultural norms, to preserve their hegemony (Lytle, 8). 
During the war, the United States reciprocated the want for alliance, and began eyeing 
Iran as a strategic ally (Lytle, 8). Relations with the Soviet Union were already strained, 
and the United States saw the value in an ally with a shared Soviet border. Iran also 
sought a relationship with the U.S. during this time, as protection from Russian 
aggression and exploitation.  
When war broke out in Europe, Reza Shah, the father of Mohammed Shah 
Pahlavi and the monarch of Iran at the time, saw the United States as a neutral ally across 
the sea that could lend support and funds. US said they were different than old world 
imperial powers and could transform Iran. Reza Shah had a strategy to induce American 
involvement. He  
“understood that substantial inducements would be necessary to raise the level of 
American concern. He had already acceded to President Roosevelt’s request in 
1939 that he reopen Iran’s legation in Washington. His government removed 
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another potential irritant by agreeing to pay for the recent expropriated 
Presbyterian mission schools. The newly appointed minister to Washington 
opened preliminary discussions for a trade agreement as well as for financial 
credits, airplanes, and technical advisors (Lytle, 8).” 
Reza Shah also understood what motivated the Western World: oil concessions. He 
attempted to attract American involvement in Iran by offering a concession to the United 
States. This would not only benefit the U.S.’s coffers, but would “reduc[e] Iran’s 
financial dependence on AIOC (Lytle, 8).” Unfortunately, this move was the last straw 
for the Soviet Union, who made it clear that American concessions in Iran, so close to its 
border, was unacceptable (Lytle, 12). 
 Iran, eventually, was used as a pawn in the standoff between Russia and the 
United States. This position, between two superpowers, haunted Iran after the conclusion 
of World War II.  
Domestically, Reza Shah was dealing with the cost of showing alliance to the 
West. During his rule, resentment of perceived foreign influence in Iranian government 
continued to grow. Khan, instead of providing the stability for Iran to claim its political 
identity, instead increased nationalistic sentiment. When his son, Mohammed Reza Shah, 
ascended the throne, the sentiment only strengthened. In an environment where the 
people were claiming their nationalism, the Shah aligned himself with the Western 
powers and culture, hearkening back to the Qajar dynasty. Resentment between the 
nationalist supporters and Iranian elite grew until it exploded into the election of 
Mohammed Mossadegh, when the United States lost its favored place in the eyes of the 
Iranian government. 
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 Iran’s foray into selling oil concessions did not begin with the United States. 
Iranian leaders, especially Khan, often rewarded concessions to Western countries as a 
way to raise government funds. In turn, they suggested, concession owners would prevent 
communist Russia from seizing and appropriating Iran’s oil reserves. One of these 
concessions, a particularly lucrative one, was sold to William Knox D’Arcy, a Briton. 
Mossadegh, however, did not support the sale or continued ownership by 
outsiders of Iranian oil. He wanted to reclaim and nationalize the oil industry, which 
would be an enormous financial blow to British interests. Mossadegh brought two things 
to the table: first, his passionate faith in the rule of law, and second, an unshakable belief 
that Iranians must rule themselves (Kinzer, 53). With political prowess, emotional 
understanding, and elite, European education, he passionately believed in removing 
foreign interest and supporting democratic rule in Iran. After a short stint as Reza’s 
minister of finance, Mossadegh came out as a fierce opponent to Reza’s government and 
policy. He attacked Reza’s attempt at becoming Shah with a warning toward 
“authoritarian tendencies and predicted that elevating him to the throne would lead the 
country back to absolutism (Kinzer, 59).” When Reza, again with a tenuous relationship 
with the British, was forced by them to abdicate in 1941, Mossadegh finally had the 
chance to see the Iran of his dreams.  
In the 1943 election, the first free election for Iran in many years, Mossadegh 
revived his political ambitions, much to the anger of the British and Shah’s son, newly-
appointed ruler Mohammad Reza Shah. He ran for office with a high approval rating, and 
somehow lost the election, which led Mossadegh and his supporters to suggest corruption 
and unfairness at the polls. After this defeat, Mossadegh organized a protest for the free, 
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fair elections until the Shah finally backed down. The Shah was planning on visiting the 
United States for the first time, and wanted to keep political situations at home smooth 
for his visit to the newly-emerging superpower.  
 By aligning himself with anti-Western Ayatollah Kashani and fiercely supporting 
nationalizing oil in Iran, Mossadegh began to garner attention from British political 
leaders, and reactions were unfavorable. For the British, this marked the end of their rule 
of Iran. They launched a heavy-handed political assault of the Iranian nationalized oil 
program. When Britain unveiled plans to invade and economically cripple Iran that 
expected American support, the US was aghast. Mossadegh was popular with the 
American public for his rhetoric and resolve. He was named Time Magazine’s ‘Man of 
the Year’ in 1951. American officials tried to negotiate with Mossadegh directly, without 
UN interference, to no avail. Mossadegh’s popularity, both at home and in America, had 
reached a fever pitch. 
The United States’ neutrality was born of lack of threat to its own economic 
interests or safety. The British urged American involvement for quite some time, due to 
the threat of communism that Mossadegh brought and the threat to its financial interests. 
Neither reason was enough to entice President Truman, and even the United Nations, into 
action.  Truman still felt that Iran could be a key ally in the Cold War and didn’t want to 
set a precedent of overthrowing leaders. “The Truman Administration sought to avoid 
disputes in the oil-rich region of the Middle East, fearing the possibility of involvement 
by communist powers. For Truman, keeping the Middle East in the Western camp was a 
necessity (Pashai, 52).” However, actions by the Truman administration inadvertently 
weakened the Iranian position in the oil fight: “While Truman had no intention to 
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undermine Mossadegh, soon after the nationalization of AIOC, United States developed a 
plan to provide oil to countries affected by Britain blockade of Iranian oil….This plan 
inadvertently helped Britain and undermined Mossadegh’s government (Pashai, 57).” 
Unfortunately, the American dedication to neutrality ended with the election of 
decidedly anti-Communist Dwight Eisenhower. “But little by little, the CIA started to 
wane Mossadegh’s supporters. The CIA paid a great amount of money to the Toilers 
party to stop supporting Mossadegh…Mossadegh also lost some of his wealthy 
supporters as a result of reforms applied by him to keep the country’s economy from 
declining while the oil boycott was in full power. When Mossadegh started to lose his 
allies, Eisnehower decided that it was time for covert actions (Pashai, 58-9).” 
Eisenhower represented a larger ideology shift in the United States: communism 
was the ultimate evil and had to be eradicated. Racial liberalism can be seen in the fight 
against Cold War threats. The Dulles brothers, John Foster and Allen, intensified the fear 
of communism (Kinzer, n.p.). From their lofty positions as Secretary of State and CIA 
director, respectively, the two believed that “any country not decisively allied with the 
United States was a potential enemy,” and Iran, with its oil reserves, shared border with 
the Soviet Union, nationalist Prime Minister, and active communist party, was expected 
to surely fall to communism if intervention was denied (Kinzer, n.p.). According to 
Borstelmann,  
“Liberals and racial egalitarians argued that the Cold War competition with the 
Communist bloc required the United States to live up fully to its proclaimed 
ideals of freedom and equality for all. Otherwise, the Soviets would win over the 
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world’s nonwhite majority and the future of the globe would be theirs 
(Borstelmann, 107).”  
Communism was, contradictorily, held at fault for anti-segregationist and 
segregationist activities. “Congressman Adam Clayton Powell of New York called the 
arrests of black bus boycotters in Montgomery in February 1956 ‘another ghastly victory 
for communism’ (Borstelmann, 108),” while “[conservative and segregationist] equally 
anti-Communist language targeted support for racial equality and integration as 
subversive of American freedom (Borstelmann, 108).” The FBI stated that “…The only 
whites who cared about the Till [lynching] case must have been Communists 
(Borstelmann, 99).” Communism was seen as the cause of any racial ill in the United 
States and abroad, and therefore opposition to communism came to be associated with the 
defense of the white citizen. 
Yet the threat of communism spreading was somewhat exaggerated by the British 
in an attempt to get the United States to back their attempts at overthrowing Mossadegh 
(Pashai, 64). “Also, the Central Intelligence Agony (CIA), which was established in 
1947, did not have enough information about Iran’s Communist Party, the Tudeh, to 
make informed policy decisions. AS a result, Britain tried to overemphasize the 
importance of the Tudeh party and range of its activities in order to persuade the U.S. to 
support British policy (Pashai, 65).”  
During the Eisenhower administration, Congressman and future Undersecretary 
of State, Chester Bowles, summed up the distinction between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ 
affairs: “In this sense, as in so many others, the division between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ 
policy no longer has meaning (Borstelmann, 86).” Race relations at home shaped how the 
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American public viewed the Cold War and international affairs. The racial tensions were 
kept in mind when dealing with foreign nations. “Racial thinking influenced 
Eisenhower’s evaluation of the two states he most feared, the Soviet Union and the 
People’s Republic of China[,](Borstelmann, 105)” two powerful Communist countries. In 
Eisenhower’s eyes, and the opinion of many politicos in the country, communism was 
racialized.  
Communism, as the absence of property rights, was contradictory to the racial 
order. The New Deal, a series of social programs that sprung into existence as a response 
to the great depression, linked the white citizen to the capitalist order. What defined the 
citizen was the ability to own property, but in a system where no one owns land, there is 
no citizen and other. There is no unified white race in their lofty position on the racial 
hierarchy. Communism itself was a threat to the racial order of the world, and it, 
combined with the fall of colonialism and the increasing reliance on oil and wealth in 
non-Western countries, became a national security emergency. People abroad did not 
necessarily agree that Communism was at fault for their lot in life. “The Eisenhower 
administration found it difficult to convince Asians and Africans that the expansion of 
Soviet influence represented a new and more powerful form of colonialism (Borstelmann, 
113).” Eisenhower no longer saw the oil issue as between Britain and Iran. He saw it as a 
chance to thwart communism from spreading. Iran, with its history with Russia, would be 
a prime candidate to fall to communism. Using this rhetoric, Eisenhower committed the 
nation to assist Britain and remove Mossadegh, who touched on communist themes in his 
rule, from office. 
The media was taken with the communist threat. According to Pashai, 
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“The tense political atmosphere of the Cold War was also reflected in the media. 
When Iran took over AIOC, Time magazine mentioned the move as the worst 
happening since the fall of China to communism. British officials used the 
hyperbolic perspectives of the era and convinced the American that Iran will fall 
to communism under Mossadegh. Christopher Montague Woodhouse, Britain’s 
Secret Intelligence Service Officer, mentioned that when he came to the United 
States from Britain in 1952 to discuss the coup arrangement, he decided not to use 
the old traditional British argument that since Mossadegh nationalized British 
property, he should be ousted. Instead, Woodhouse decided to emphasize the 
communist threat in Iran in order to make U.S. officials comply with the plan of 
the coup (Pashai, 66).” 
 
The connection between white citizenship and capitalism was forged in the New 
Deal. The New Deal was specific to helping the white citizen after the Great Depression. 
As Katznelson states: 
“Affirmative action then was white. New national policies enacted in the pre-civil 
rights, last-gasp era of Jim Crow constituted a massive transfer of quite specific 
privileges to white Americans. New programs produced economic and social 
opportunity for favored constituencies and thus widened the gap between white 
and black Americans in the aftermath of the Second World War. And the 
effects…did not stop even after discriminatory codes were swept aside by the 
civil rights movement and the legislation that inspired it (22).” 
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Framers of the New Deal used three mechanisms to leave Black Americans out of the 
economic recovery. They used language to exclude traditionally Black employment from 
receiving benefits, allowed deeply-prejudiced local policymakers as gatekeepers of the 
benefits, and prevented anti-discrimination riders from being attached to New Deal 
legislation. This resulted in: “a wide array of public policies…providing most white 
Americans with valuable tools to advance their social welfare – insure their old age, get 
good jobs, acquire economic security, build assets, and gain middle-class status – [while] 
most black Americans were left behind or left out (Katznelson, 22-3).” 
 This flurry of activity and social programs attached the privileges enjoyed by 
white citizens to the growth and expansion of capitalism after WWII. The New Deal 
elevated those hit by the recession to capitalistic workers, if they were white. Capitalism 
and the New Deal became inextricably linked. The New Deal allowed for the white 
citizen to join the capital order. By doing this, the New Deal linked racial liberalism to 
the Cold War, such that using undemocratic methods to defeat communism could be 
framed as democratic (because those methods were used in defense of the white citizen). 
Defending capitalism was to defend the white citizen, and defending capitalism was to 
defeat communism. 
To combat this racial, communist threat, Kermit Roosevelt, of the Roosevelt 
dynasty, orchestrated the coup on Mossadegh. Operation Ajax, as the CIA called it, was 
divided into four parts. First, the combined wealth of the United States and Britain would 
bribe mosques and religious leaders, the press, and mobs to portray Mossadegh in a 
negative light. This proved so effective that one propagandist, Richard Cottam, claimed 
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that four-fifths of newspapers inside of Tehran were being bribed by the CIA (Kinzer, 
n.p.).  
When Mossadegh’s image was sufficiently tarnished by supposed anti-Mossadegh 
mobs, royalist military officers would then visit his home and deliver a decree, signed by 
the Shah, dismissing Mossadegh as Prime Minister. Unfortunately, this step proved to be 
difficult. Though the Shah attempted to align himself with Western powers, he believed 
that the direct act of dismissing Mossadegh was illegal. He had to be convinced to sign 
the decree by visits from his sister, Princess Ashraf, and by Kermit Roosevelt himself. 
Finally, the Shah acquiesced. 
The third step in the process again relied upon bribes. Mobs were to descend the 
streets and take control, to prove Mossadegh’s lack of power and support. Finally, 
General Zahedi, the American- and British-approved Prime Minister, would accept the 
Shah’s nomination and ascend his position.  
The United States’ Kermit Roosevelt was the mastermind of the coup and a report 
written by CIA operative Donald Wilber was understood to be a handbook for future 
coups. Commissioned by the Historical division, “[i]ts intended audience was senior 
officials not only in the CIA, but also in the Pentagon, State Department, White House, 
and Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Abrahamian, 183).” These materials were not 
declassified on the usual schedule. Wilber’s report wasn’t declassified until the year 
2000, and details of the coup were unclear to that point. 
In the coming pages, I show that U.S. political leaders effectively justified the 
coup to the American public by building on and extending the links between racial 
liberalism and the Cold War. Using the press, I argue, they cast the Shah as an exemplary 
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defender of the white democratic citizen from the threat posed by communism, and 
Mohammed Mossadegh as a threat to the rights of the White citizen. 




To highlight the role racial liberalism played in framing the coup as democratic 
and generating popular support for it, I examine media coverage. Through the 
information release in 2000, we know that the orchestrators of the Coup relied heavily 
upon both American and Iranian media to portray their image of the Shah. The CIA 
manipulated both American and Iranian media to portray Mossadegh as “‘favoring the 
communists,’ ‘threatening Islam,’ ‘creating public disorder,’ ‘giving power to 
unscrupulous politicians,’ and ‘deliberately leading the country to economic disorder 
(Abrahamian, 203).’” Articles were planted, reporters bribed, and stories spun to show 
how unfit Mossadegh was to lead, and that Iran was teetering on the edge of communism.  
The newspaper is also where popular discourse is formed. In an era before the 
internet or widespread television usage, newspaper articles were the quickest way to 
mold the mind of the public. They were an important channel of communication, and 
therefore, controlling the newspapers was controlling the populace.  
“When considering foreign policy matters, the general public is especially 
dependent on the news media because very few people have access to first-hand 
information about US foreign policy issues. The US news media are instrumental 
in creating, perpetuating, and modifying images of foreign nations and 
international leaders (Merrill, 1991). Media analysts often use a contemporary 
term called "spinning a story" to refer to attempts by an individual or organization 
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to manipulate or control the media coverage of a specific issue. (Brown and 
Vincent, 66)" 
For information on Iran, the public was especially dependent on the media. Iran was a 
mysterious country, and few had knowledge of it outside of what was read in the 
newspapers. Therefore, “spinning a story” was easier on stories centered on Iran, due to a 
lack of previous knowledge of the happenings in the Middle Eastern country. The 
vacuum of knowledge of Iran was filled with planted and bribed stories that emphasized 
the whiteness of the Shah and the racial otherness of Mossadegh. These stories were used 
to convince the public of the necessity of a change in power in Iran and justify the 
American perceived support of the Shah. 
The racial liberalism in this case is present at all levels of the media. I examine 
three newspapers: the New York Times, the most recognizable newspaper in the country; 
to the Washington Post, with its finger on the pulse of the political; to the small Hartford 
Courant. The New York Times is the nation’s most recognizable newspaper, with a large 
readership and trusted reporting base. The Washington Post is based in Washington, D.C. 
and reports heavily on the political happenings of the United States, influencing policy-
makers and pundits. Finally, the Hartford Courant is a local newspaper in Hartford, 
Connecticut. The Courant has an extensive digital archive and shows media that is not 
elite-facing, media that is read by locals. In these, the Shah is effectively whitewashed 
and, conversely, Mossadegh is made to be the other. This attitude toward the Shah and 
Mossadegh is present in multiple levels of media, from national press outlets to local 
newspapers. 
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To gather evidence about how articles in the Times, the Post, and the Courant 
whitewashed the Shah and portrayed Mossadegh as the racial other, I ran six searches in 
the Arizona State University Library Database. The searches were 
“Iran+Shah+[Newspaper Title]” and “Iran+Mossadegh+[Newspaper Title].” I then 
filtered the results by type to only include newspaper articles. I then further narrowed 
down the results by relevance, and 50 articles for each search were downloaded and 
analyzed. For each article, I wrote a summary, focusing on identifying instances in which 
the author(s) associated the Shah with the characteristics of the white citizen and 
Mossadegh with those of the racial other. As I suggested in the history section above, 
dominant discourse of the time generally framed the white citizen as someone who had 
the hallmarks of white citizenship at the time of the Coup (dedication to Democracy and 
property rights; alliance with the Western, non-slave class; and hatred of communism). 
The media preserved these characteristics in the Shah’s portrayal, while conversely 
eliminating these characteristics from the narrative of Mohammed Mossadegh. Dominant 
discourse framed the racial other as someone who was dictatorial, hated the West, and 
sympathized with Communism. In associating the Shah with the White Citizen and 
Mossadegh with the racial other, the media used racial liberalism to help justify the coup. 
The veracity of claims that the Shah and Mossadegh actually fit these descriptions 
of the white citizen and the racial other has come into question. Double standards abound 
when discussing the two men, who actually had much in common. Both were European 
educated, came from very rich families, shared religion and culture (Kinzer, 53). 
However, for Mossadegh, his education is rarely mentioned, aside from the “Dr.” 
occasionally thrown in front of his name. His extreme wealth is only mentioned when 
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contrasted with his austere policies and objections to what are seen as the Shah’s social 
justice programs (10 Hurt in Iran Protest,’ 1953). 
 In addition, a striking double standard presented itself after the overthrow of 
Mossadegh. During his reign, Iranian intrigues with the Soviet Union were seen as not 
contentious, borderline friendly, which complemented his association with communist 
groups (Love, ‘Iran’s Mossadegh Riding Tudeh Communist Tiger,’ E4). However, when 
the Shah came into power again, and mentioned that the Soviet Union could be their only 
hope for funds for the poverty-stricken nation, American media did not accuse the Shah 
of being a communist (‘Iran is Resuming Talks with Soviet,’ 1;). The blame for Iran’s 
troubles and the reason they were in the position to accept aid from anyone, fell on 
Mossadegh, whom “the Monarch accused….of bequeathing Iran a terrible situation 
(‘Shah Declares Iran is Broke, Will Accept Aid From Anyone,’ 1).” In fact, the American 
government’s plan to give Iran financial aid solidified after this exchange, to protect Iran 
from communist influence (‘Eisenhower Seen Moving to Aid Iran,’ 1). 
In the case of the Shah and Mossadegh, language used in these articles supports 
the whitewashing of the Shah. Mossadegh is portrayed as “frail (‘Mossadegh, In Bed 
Aloft, Flying to N.Y.,’ 1; ‘Mossadegh Arrives for UN Oil Fight,’ 1), “ailing (‘Mossadegh 
Cries, Tells Iran More Hardships Coming,’ M5)”, “tired (‘Mossadegh Cheered on return 
to Iran,’ 2)”, and “emotional (‘Mossadegh Pleads For Hands Off In Oil Wrangle,’p. 
17B)”. His speaking style is criticized for his tears and fainting. Meanwhile, the Shah is 
portrayed as “youthful (‘Catholics Promised Freedom by Iran Shah,’ 2)” and “handsome 
(‘Her Highness Even Looks Like a Princess,’ C1)”. However, both men have similar 
backgrounds. Reporters constantly questioned Mossadegh’s health (‘Mossadegh, In Bed 
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Aloft, Flying to N.Y.,’ 1), every episode of fatigue mentioned, even if it bore no matter to 
the article’s subject. The Shah’s health problems were rarely mentioned, though he also 
had a chronic condition (‘Shah of Iran has Appendectomy,’ 2). The few times it is 
mentioned, the Shah is portrayed as thoroughly Western, as he solicited Western facilities 
to treat his condition. 
Discussion  
Dedication to Democracy  
 The reality of the Iranian Coup and American involvement did not become public 
knowledge until much later. In fact, media and the Shah himself had tried to preempt the 
narrative that Mossadegh was the democratic leader in Iran. The Shah himself tried to 
take on the mantle of warrior for democracy himself. When the ‘free elections’ of 1949 
were accused of not being free, he was adamant in their freedom: “The Shah of Iran, 
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, today told Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh, former premier, that 
there was no evidence that parliamentary elections in Teheran were not free. Dr. 
Mossadegh had taken refuge in the Imperial Palace last Friday under an ancient Iranian 
custom in protest against alleged violations of election freedom in the capital (‘Shah Says 
Vote is Free,’ 1949).” In one fell swoop, the quote reassures the Shah’s dedication to free 
elections and shows Mossadegh’s stubborn nature.  
 The Shah was often promoted as dedicated to social justice and social security. 
His water system dedication in Shiraz in 1952 was praised as “put[ting] himself on the 
side of progress (‘Iran’s Shah to Make Rare Public Visit,’ 1952).”In 1950, he spoke to 
Parliament, stating that “the issues were food, clothing, shelter, health and education for 
all. He said his government would present bills to lower the cost of living. A seven-year 
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plan will be the basis of projected series of social reforms, the Shah declared, and bribery 
and corruption will be rooted out and social justice promoted (‘Reforms in Iran 
Demanded by Shah,’ 1950).”  
 After the Coup, the Shah did not miss a chance to once again praise the United 
States’ influence on his way of rule: “He termed US policy ‘idealistic as well as realistic,’ 
and added: ‘This is undoubtedly the greatest single factor contributing to the peace and 
security of the world (‘Shah of Iran Praises US Design for Peace,’ 1955).’” He even went 
so far as to claim that the United States’ Fair Deal Plan was the impetus for his own 
policies: “The [seven-year] plan, he said, was something like President Truman’s Fair 
Deal program, only more so. ‘Because your social and economic conditions are better 
than ours, I have to go a little further, and use a little more drastic measures (‘Shah 
Likens Iran’s Plan to New Deal, 1949).’” 
 The assumed dedication to democracy and justice perceived of the Shah 
positioned him as the true ruler of Iran. Elizabeth Maguire, of the Washington Post, while 
reporting on the Shah’s visit to the United States, reminded readers that, “The Shah is not 
an absolute monarch, contrary to general belief, and does not aspire to be cast in the role 
Oriental potentate. He prefers being a modern, liberal governor, improving the condition 
of his people (‘Shah of Iran’s a Very Modern Monarch,’ 1949).” 
 High moral standing also marked reporting on the Shah’s rule. When he signed 
the oil nationalization act, the press emphasized the fact that “The Shah has no veto and 
had no recourse but to sign the law,” due to his less-than-absolute monarchal powers 
(‘Iran’s Oil Seizure Act Signed by Shah,’ 1951). When Mossadegh was convicted of 
treason, the Shah was portrayed as a magnanimous ruler, as “Mossadegh could have been 
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sentenced to death, but Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi – when the emotional nationalist 
leader tried to oust late August – came to his rescue with a royal mercy plea (‘Mossadegh 
Appeals Sentence, Whole Case Must be Reheard,’ 1953).” 
 The Shah’s place as ruler was reiterated in the alleged “deep affection” the 
populace had for the monarch. Demonstrations by Mossadegh’s followers and 
Communists were often met with counter revolts by pro-monarchists (‘Iran greets Shah 
with Joy, Tears,’ 1953). In fact, in 1953, the Hartford Courant attributed Mossadegh’s 
downfall to this love affair between the Shah and the people (‘Monarchy May End in 
Fabled Iran’, 1953).  The actual coup was assisted by pro-Shah factions: “Forces loyal to 
the absent Shah swept iron-willed, weepy old Mossadegh out of power today with a 
blood and violent nine-hour coup…the aged premier himself fled today from his bed in a 
Hitler-type bunker from which he has ruled his country with tears and an iron fist for 
almost three years….The mobs instead of meeting resistance from Mossadegh’s police, 
found the gendarmes shouting pro-Shah slogans. People leaned out their windows and 
echoed them. (‘Mossadegh flees, Shah’s Forces Rule Iran,’ 1953).” 
 Mossadegh’s comparison to Hitler was not unusual in the American media. He 
was referred to as a dictator, and his powers dictatorial. The Hartford Courant claimed 
Mossadegh’s tactics “brought him almost dictatorial powers of this Middle East 
nation…(‘Mossadegh Indictment is Signed,’ 1953).” The Washington Post went a step 
further, calling Mossadegh’s regime a “dictatorship” when discussing his downfall 
(‘Mossadegh Foe Resigns in Iran’, 1955). The newspaper also had additional comments 
during the regime: extending Mossadegh’s powers would be “giving a blank check to 
rule nearly every phase of Iranian life by decree…[He] then will have power to institute 
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at will, soak-the-rich taxes, economic and financial reforms, government banking 
controls, a possible military cut down and work projects…(‘Mossadegh About to Get a 
Free Hand to Rule Iran,’ 1952).” The New York Times’ assessment of Mossadegh went 
further: “Observers here wonder how a man with such a background could in his ripe 
years have drafted a jurists’ nightmare like the oil nationalization law,” including 
“systematically oppos[ing] everything.” 
 The nearly dictatorial powers that Mossadegh was claimed to have were reported 
on often. The result of his ruthless rule, according to the succeeding premier, Fazollah 
Zahedi, resulted in an Iranian debt of $544 million and deprivation of $2 million from the 
treasury by “improper licensing of rice export firms (‘Iran’s Regime Asks Pardons from 
Shah’, 1953).” His ruthlessness didn’t end there, allegedly. Deputy Mohammed Ali 
Shusshtan claimed his life was threatened because he opposed nationalization of oil, due 
to Mossadegh and his followers (‘Mossadegh Foe Charges Life Threat,’ 1951).. 
Western Alliance 
 Mossadegh’s positioning with the Communist element in his country was not 
necessarily his own doing. However, he did alienate the United States and the West 
without help from the media, creating an ‘Us vs. Them’ mentality in his country. 
Understandably, Mossadegh and the British had their intense differences. In fact, in a 
speech described as “bridge-burning,” Mossadegh blamed the troubles of the Iranian 
people on the British and “expelled the British technicians” from the country, to which 
the United States responded by saying the decision “is to be regretted (‘Mossadegh 
Severs Ties with Britain,’ 1952).” He demanded reparations be paid by the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company, to which the British heartily scoffed.  
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Due to their ideological proximity to Britain, the United States was often accused 
of siding with the British by Mossadegh (‘Impartial, Ike Assured Mossadegh,’ 1953). 
Mobs of Mossadegh supporters, often shouting “Anti-American” slogans, destroyed 
property and incited riots (‘US Homes, Cars Stoned by Iran Mob’, 1953). Iran’s extensive 
history with invading foreign regimes was reflected in Mossadegh’s attitude toward the 
West. He condemned the international community, saying 
Some foreigners endeavor to misinterpret and distort any step the Iranian 
nation takes [in] its aspirations…[T]he Iranian people have forged a bond of unity 
and are resolved to cut off the hands foreigners have extended into the country, 
which is the very thing of which a particular group is afraid. They try by any 
means to deny us moral help [of world opinion]. The attitude recently adopted by 
some world statesmen to portray our national rising as caused by other than its 
true and actual factors affects the best evidence supporting this assertion 
(Mossadegh Charges Distortion on Iran, 1953). 
 Even in his defense against the treason charges brought forth after the Coup, 
Mossadegh cited Western and foreign involvement as the reason for the country’s 
downfall. “In my opinion,” he said, in his closing defense, “we practically are a member 
of the Western bloc, but must not officially be so…Neither the Eastern or Western bloc 
pays any attention to the interests of small nations (‘Mossadegh Ends Defense, Urges Iran 
Neutrality,’ 1953).” 
 Mossadegh’s plea fell on deaf ears. Much like during his previous reign, the Shah 
aligned himself closely with the Western world. Though Mossadegh admonished the UN 
and claimed it had no control over Iran while it was ruling on the oil crisis, a few years 
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earlier “[T]he Shah…emphasized the importance of friendly relations with all countries 
of the UN (‘Iran Parliament Opens,’ 1947).” In a speech to the National Press Club in the 
United States, the Shah portrayed the previous administration as a creator of chaos and 
the reason the oil industry faltered. He recognized individual countries, including his 
elation at reestablished relations with Britain. He lauded praise upon the United States 
and thanked them for their aid (‘Address by Shah of Iran to National Press Club’, 1954). 
 On the same trip to the United States, the Shah continued his praise of the United 
States, and cast himself and his country as their natural ally, including the assertion that 
warm relations between the two countries will “strengthen the stability and progress of 
the Middle East(‘Shah of Iran Arrives for Three-Day Visit,’ 1954).”  
Communism 
 The Shah’s association with the white citizen and Mossadegh with the racial other 
are also quite prevalent, regardless of whether the men themselves identified with a 
certain group. For instance, the Shah’s family was often reported on. They were 
beautiful, Western, spoke English and flew to Paris. The Shah placed himself as a leader 
on the level with the American President Truman: “Speaking English well, the 
Shah…expressed his personal admiration for President Truman’s candor and said he 
subscribed to the President’s Fair Deal Program as expressed in Mr. Truman’s speech at 
St. Paul (Feinberg, 1949).” With statements like this, the Shah acknowledges his 
similarities to the President.  
 President Truman also participated in the association game. When the Shah 
visited in 1949, the Truman administration spared no expense for pomp and 
circumstance: “The ruler of Iran will be greeted at the airport by President Truman. He 
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will be rendered full military honors and then move to the head of the parade formation 
(‘Thousands Here to Hail Shah Today,’ 1949).” The Shah was seen as a legitimate leader 
and friend of the United States in the Middle East. He was played football with college 
teams, flew a bomber, and was accepted into American society readily. He was, 
according to Mary Van Rensselaer Thayer, “no despotic Oriental potentate (Van 
Rensselaer Thayer, 1949).” 
 On the other hand, Mossadegh was associated with that which was the United 
States’ biggest fear: communism. Though never a self-professed communist, the reds 
inside Iran were often attributed to Mossadegh’s followers and in cahoots with 
Mossadegh’s highest advisors. Mossadegh’s Interior Minister, in fact, was accused of 
inciting a “Communist…demonstration… [which] killed from 12 to 25 persons 
(‘Harriman Hits Blank Wall in Iran Oil Talks’, 1951)” in response to the American W. 
Averell Harriman’s arrival to discuss the oil crisis.  
 When Communists and Mossadegh supporters were not mentioned in the same 
breath, they were still placed next to each other in terms of ideology. In ‘Iran Street Riots 
Kill 1; Many Hurt,’ the Hartford Courant points out that the Tudeh (communist) party is 
not Mossadegh’s party, but “nevertheless pressed actions in support of 
Mossadegh…(‘Iran Street Riots Kill 1; Many Hurt,’ 1953). Kennett Love of the New 
York Times mentions that Mossadegh’s government is “widely accused of having come 
to an understanding with the Tudeh party, giving its members the freedom of the streets 
and tolerating them in government departments in return for political support. The 
government denies these allegations, but it does not seem to be particularly embarrassed 
by them (‘Iran’s Mossadegh Riding Tudeh Communist Tiger,’ E4).” 
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Casting Mossadegh in the same realm as communists did not end when he was 
ousted. After the coup, Iran’s government was described as “anti-Communist, anti-
Mossadegh (‘Eisenhower Seen Moving Aid to Iran,’ 1953).” According to Robert C. 
Doty of the New York Times, “Tudeh mobs played an increasingly important part in 
maintaining Dr. Mossadegh in power during the last four months of his regime, and the 
former Premier winked at the law banning the party…The Tudeh has made no attempt to 
lift its head since Dr. Mossadegh’s overthrow, and was reported to have received orders 
to await a more favorable opportunity to reassert itself (Doty, ‘New regime in Iran Opens 
War on Reds’, 1).”  
The Shah was complimented for his land use program, which dissolved several 
thousands of acres of royal estates for sharecroppers to work. The program represented 
the Shah’s attributed dedication to social justice (‘Reforms in Iran Demanded by Shah,’ 
11; ‘Shah Breaks Precedent,’ 11). Meanwhile, Mossadegh was portrayed as being 
reluctant in participating in the program, which would require donations from other 
wealthy landowners. An article on a clash in the capital alluded to Mossadegh’s guilt in 
the delay of these reforms: “The clash [between Mossadegh supporters and Shah 
supporters] occurred shortly after the disclosure that the Shah had temporarily abandoned 
his plan to distribute some of his lands to the peasants because Dr. Mossadegh had 
complained it would create difficulties for other big landowners like himself (‘10 Hurt in 
Iran Protest,’ 1953).” 
 The irony in this situation is that this program was a socialist, almost communist 
program. It allowed peasants to work other land and pay their sharecropping dues, 
partially going to a fund to help other peasants and farmers (‘Mossadegh Orders new 
  40 
Levy to Aid Iran Tenants,’ 1). The media and the West, accusing Mossadegh of having 
close ties to communism, did not point out that these reforms his followers were 
protesting were socialist at the very least. Another irony is that it was praised by Justice 
William O’Douglas as an answer to communist threat in Iran: “The Shah gave me details 
of his large-scale land distribution program…It’s an excellent idea to fight poverty, 
which will cause the spread of communism (‘Douglas Visits Iran’s Shah’, 1955).” 
The most effective way of whitewashing the Shah, however, had to do with the 
ever-present threat of communism, which eventually led President Eisenhower to 
intervene and stage the coup. Mohammed Mossadegh did not consider the feelings of the 
West when he “h[e]ld high-level negotiations here to iron out ‘all differences,’ including 
financial and territorial disputes” with the Soviet Union in 1953 (Love, ‘Iran-Soviet Talks 
on High Level Set, 1).  
 Meanwhile, the Shah and his supporters were sensitive to the plight of the West 
and the fear of Communism. Abolhassan Ebtehaj, director of the Shah’s seven-year plan, 
stated the plan was “essential for stopping a possible revival of communism in Iran 
(‘Shah of Iran Approves 7 Year Economic Plan,’ 1955).” 
 Even before Mossadegh rose to power, the West was wary of communism so near 
Iran. “One of the aims” of the land share policy, “is to make peasants less susceptible to 
the communism of Iran’s northern neighbor, the Soviet Union (‘Shah of Iran Starts to 
Give Away Lands’, 1951).” In 1953, the Shah told parliament “Iran must not lag behind 
other non-Communist nations in defense against Communist aggressions (‘Iran Must Not 
Lag in Defense Plans’, Shah Tells Nation, 1953).”  
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 How were these extreme characterizations of Mossadegh and the Shah used to 
justify involvement to the public? Mohammed Reza Shah became associated with the 
White citizen (the democratic subject under racial liberalism) and Mohammed 
Mossadegh was associated with the racial other (the threat to democracy under racial 
liberalism). Though their actions and beliefs did not always follow this pattern, the press 
framed each man as dictatorial or democratic. Regardless of the reason, coercion or 
bribery, the press wrote its story about the men and manipulated information until it fit 
the role each man had been cast. The press even told the Iranian people that Mossadegh – 
emotional, old, dictator – had lost power well before it happened (Kinzer, 177), writing 
his downfall into history. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 Racial liberalism is a framework in which we can examine the United States and 
the international relations thereof. It reconciles differences between perceived values and 
executed actions. In the United States itself, the citizenship question is inherently 
racialized. Minorities are not protected by institutions such as the police at quite the same 
rate as the white citizen. Capitalism favors the white citizen on the backs of the racialized 
minorities, those disproportionately making minimum wage and living in poverty. 
Medical deportation, a practice in which undocumented immigrants are repatriated to 
their country of origin if they suffer an injury or illness deemed too expensive for the 
hospital to cover, is a clear example of racial liberalism within our borders: the citizens 
are eligible for medical insurance through the Affordable Care Act. The other, which is 
disproportionately Hispanic, is considered to be worth less than the amount of their care, 
ineligible for health insurance and even care at many hospitals, being repatriated without 
consent or arrangements for care in their destination. 
This paper set out to apply the theory of racial liberalism to the American 
involvement in the Coup of Iran. The theory adequately reconciled the American public’s 
devotion to democracy with their support of seemingly anti-democratic activities abroad. 
Information on the Coup in Iran is relatively new to study, which makes this an 
interesting case. The information on the Shah and Mossadegh had been previously 
filtered through the media and the American government, which therefore controlled the 
public opinion of each character. Kermit Roosevelt and President Eisenhower’s extensive 
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involvement in the Coup was unknown until recently, as was the fact that the media was 
actively manipulated to whitewash the Shah and make Mossadegh the racial other. 
 The theory has been applied to domestic situations, but not often to foreign 
policy. Olson, in The Abolition of White Democracy, applies the theory of racial 
liberalism to American slavery in the Antebellum South and posits that race was invented 
to justify the defense of property rights and profits for the upper classes. This parallels the 
Iran case. During his trial, Mossadegh succinctly stated his criminal actions: “My only 
crime is that I nationalized the Iranian oil industry and removed from this land the 
network of colonialism and the political and economic influence of the greatest empire on 
earth (Kinzer, 193).” He understood his crime was that he limited the White citizen’s 
property rights, resulting in his removal. 
 While this sets the stage for our case study, it also creates limitations. The true 
natures of the Shah and Mossadegh have been obscured by years of rhetoric and media 
spin, making it difficult to differentiate between what information has been manipulated 
and what has not. It would be interesting to compare these articles to Iranian newspaper 
articles of the time, though Kermit Roosevelt and the CIA leaned heavily upon the 
Iranian media to print whitewashing articles. 
Racial liberalism pervades our culture, establishing citizenship for a certain class 
of people, and leaving the racial other on the outside of the citizen sphere. Awareness of 
the influence of racial liberalism helps us to understand how U.S. political leaders can 
justify anti-democratic interventions abroad to an ostensibly democratic public at home.  
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